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Abstract—Smartphones, whose market share has increased by
54% between 2009 and 2010, is one of the favored platform
for “Convergence Computing”. Convergence Computing is a
technology in which a single device can provide various services
without any restrictions from external devices or networks.
Today, smartphones as convergent single device have diverse
functions and features such as calling, Internet surfing, game
playing, banking, storage of personal and professional data,
etc. Some of these use encryption algorithms such as AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard). For example, this algorithm is
used to authenticate server protocols or to encrypt confidential
information. This paper shows that an Electromagnetic Analysis
(EMA) on AES is possible on a Java mobile phone to extract
secret keys. The latter can then be used for forensic purposes
or to recover encrypted data stored in the device. Experiments
involving two successful approaches are described and compared
: Spectral Density based Approach (SDA) and Template based
Resynchronisation Approach (TRA).
I. INTRODUCTION AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Smartphones are miniature computers embedding advanced
software enabling them to execute very complex applications.
To ensure the authentication and encryption of data within
some of these applications, symmetric encryption algorithms,
like the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES [1]), use secret
keys stored in the smartphone. The recovery of such secret
keys can be useful for forensic and data recovery purposes.
Several invasive, semi-invasive and non-invasive attacks are
possible to extract them.
An example of an invasive attack is the memory dump.
This technique first consists in physically extracting the Flash
memory [2] and reading the memory content by using a Flash
memory chip programmer. One of the disadvantages is that
this can be destructive. This technique also requires a software
driver and the right memory content interpretation [3]. Neither
is trivial when data-sheets of the Flash memory are not
available.
An example of a non-invasive approach is the exploitation of
the JTAG port [4]. However, in the latest generation of mobile
phones, manufacturers deactivate the JTAG port to avoid
this. Another non-invasive technique is called “side channel
attack”. It exploits the fact that some physical values such as
the power consumption, the electromagnetic radiation or the
duration of computation of the chip depends on its internal
computations [5]. It is of particular concern since it does
not destroy the physical integrity of the circuit and it can be
quickly mounted with cheap equipment, if several hypothesis
are met. The main hypothesis is that the attacker has to be
able to measure several times (in practice, from hundreds to
millions), the same cryptographic elementary operation with
different operands. These measurements have also to be done
in the same conditions. In particular, the elementary operations
have to be performed at the same time. Examples of extraction
of information by using the electromagnetic channel (also
called Electro-Magnetic Analysis or EMA) have been reported
on a smart card in [6] and on a Java-based PDA (Personal
Digital Assistant) in [7].
This article describes and compares two techniques used
to analyze software implementations of the AES running
on a mobile phone. It is, to our best knowledge, the first
successful side-channel attack on a up-to-date mobile phone.
We have faced two main difficulties. The first one is the
choice of the experimental setup which appeared to be slightly
different from those classically described in the literature.
The second one is due to the complexity of the smartphone.
As the AES is running on Java Virtual Machine (JVM),
which is a complex software, the elementary operations of the
AES were not realized at the same time (i.e. they were not
synchronized). The main hypothesis of side channel attack,
mentioned above, was not met. In order to overcome this
difficulty, two techniques have been proposed and compared:
Spectral Density based Approach (SDA) and Template based
Resynchronisation Approach (TRA).
In the first section the AES and the EMA used are described.
In the second one, the Java platform on mobile phones is
presented in order to explain in which conditions the analysis
can be done. Next, the experimental set-up, technical difficul-
ties met and proposed solutions are explained. After that, the
SDA and TRA are exposed and compared. Finally, two AES
implementations are analyzed and results are presented.
II. CORRELATION ELECTROMAGNETIC ATTACK ON AES
A. Advanced Encryption Standard
AES is an algorithm that performs message encryption by
data blocks of 128 bits as input and output using a key size
of 128, 192 or 256 bits respectively in 10, 12 or 14 rounds
according to the size of the key. The algorithm includes two
separate processes: one for the key scheduling to derive the
round keys from the initial secret key and the second one for
data encryption. Decryption is also divided into two separated
processes: the first one for the inverse key scheduling and the
second one is for the data decryption. In the initial round of
AES-128 1, the algorithm uses the secret key as the round key,
but for each following round, the corresponding round key is
computed from the previous one. Figure 1 shows the different
operations of the AES-128 algorithm.
Fig. 1. AES algorithm
B. Correlation ElectroMagnetic Analysis
Correlation ElectroMagnetic Analysis (CEMA) is an EMA
technique based on the statistical analysis of the correlation
between EM measured during an AES computation and the
data processed (secret key dependant). A strategy for Correla-
tion Electromagnetic Analysis would consist in the following
steps :
 step1. Measure the EM emanation. Let d, a set of D
different plain texts for encryption d=(d1 ,...,dD), for each
di is associated an EM curve ti=(ti;1,..., ti;T ) of T points.
 step2 Choose intermediate result of the executed algo-
rithm. f(d,k) where k is a small part of the key (also
called
guesses key). Let K the set of all the possible values of
k.
1AES-128 refers to the AES using keys of 128 bits
 step3 Compute some intermediate values vi;j=f(di,kj) for
i=1,...,D and j=1,...,K
 step4 Map intermediate values to theoretical EM values.
A consumption model is used during this step such as
Hamming-distance or Hamming-weight models [8].
 step5 Compare these theoretical consumption values with
those measured.
The result is a matrix R of size KT. The line index of the
highest values of the R is the index of the key actually used.
The straightforward place for an attacker to find the secret
key is during the first round [9]. Therefore, the intermediate
values used in step3 are computed according to the SubBytes
outputs.
In the next section the Java implementations of the AES
and how to setup a CEMA attack are described.
III. CEMA ON AES IMPLEMENTED ON A JAVA MOBILE
PHONE
This paragraph first describes the technical difficulties and
solutions for the experimental set-up in order to do our EMA.
Second, it shows that the attack is possible on two kind of
AES software implementations : the first one is our own Java
implementation, and the second one uses a Java cryptographic
library (the open source Bouncy Castle cryptographic library
[10]). Like for smartcards, EMA on a mobile phone requires
EM curves acquisition but there are several difficulties related
to the experimental set-up :
 Architecture of the software AES implementation.
 Choice of the EM probe.
 Physically accessing the phone’s chip deep inside the
mobile phone.
 Generating a trigger signal needed to synchronize the
firmware on the mobile phone with our acquisition plat-
form.
 Software set-up for automatic acquisitions of EM traces.
All these parts are described in details in the next sections.
A. AES implementation
Lots of AES implementations exist but this paper focuses
on the Java Platform, Micro Edition (Java ME) and the
Bouncy Castle library software implementations. To develop a
cryptographic Java ME application, developers have the choice
among :
 Developing their own implementation according to the
cryptographic algorithm specifications.
 Using a commercial or an open source implementation :
for example, the Bouncy Castle library.
 Using the manufacturer’s implementation for example
JSR 177 [11].
The first one requires development but without the help of
an external commercial library. Consequently, neither a virus,
nor a Trojan is possible. The second one has the advantage
of using all the knowledge of a developer’s company or
community. But royalties must sometimes be paid or open
source licence rules must be respected. The last one seems
to be the best solution in terms of performance and security
aspects because the manufacturer is responsible for the imple-
mentation. The JSR 177 is today only deployed on very few
mobile phones.
This paper only focuses on the first and second choices,
targeted for a 32 bit processor. In order to optimize the code
size and the performances of our own AES implementation,
we choose to combine the SubBytes and Shiftrows operations
in one operation, implemented as a lookup table in 832 bits.
In the Bouncy Castle library, the “Fast algorithm” version
of the AES has been chosen. In this version, three of the
AES operations (SubBytes, ShiftRows and MixColumns) are
grouped in one operation, also implemented as a lookup table
in 832 bits.
B. Experiment set-up
1) Trigger signal: The second technical issue is the
generation of the trigger signal. It must be sent just before
starting AES encryption. This problem is not as trivial as
it seems. Indeed all Java ME applications are executed in
a SandBox which forbids direct input/output accesses. The
only accessible inputs/outputs on a mobile phone are the
screen, loudspeaker and connections like http/SMS/Bluetooth
and file access. The solution which guarantees an acceptable
response delay is the file access on the MicroSD card. For
that, a special extension for the MicroSD’s connector has
been manufactured to facilitate the access to the MicroSD’s
PINS (Figure 2). Whenever an access command is sent, some
microSD PINS pass to high state. Our tests showed that in
order to obtain a trigger signal, the access command must be
a simple open file instruction. PIN 2 corresponding to card
detection must be connected to the scope acting as the trigger
signal).
Fig. 2. MicroSD card pinouts
2) Acquisition sequence: The acquisition set-up is illus-
trated in Figure 3. It consists of an EM probe, an oscillo-
scope, the trigger mechanism described above and a PC. The
Table I sums up the characteristics of these equipments. The
acquisition of the EM curves is performed as follows. The
mobile phone executes in a stand-alone mode, a large numbers
(typically hundreds) of AES encryptions. At the beginning
of each encryption, a signal is triggered as explained in the
paragraph III-B1. This signal launches the oscilloscope which
acquires the EM curves through the EM probe. A sleep time is
introduced between two encryptions. This sleep time enables
the oscilloscope to send the EM curves to the PC which stores
them.
Fig. 3. Experimental set-up
TABLE I
ACQUISITION CONDITIONS AND EQUIPMENTS CHARACTERISTICS
Equipment characteristics
Target Circuit RISC Processor, 32bitsclock frequency:370Mhz
Oscilloscope Lecroy 3Ghz, resolution 200 s/divsampling frequency 1GSamples/s
PC Xeon 2.67 Ghz, RAM 12Go
Soft scope
driving
Labview interface
Ethernet connection with oscilloscope
plain texts to
encrypt
2000 random plain text
changing only one of 16 the bytes
Table I, sums up characteristics and parameters of equip-
ments and conditions used during the acquisition phase. The
16 bytes of the text to be encrypted are chosen by randomly
changing only 1 byte, according to the attacked secret key
byte. Other bytes are kept fixed in order to reduce measure-
ment noise.
3) Choice of EM probe: The choice of the probe is crucial
to perform successful EMA. During our measurements
two probes are preliminary compared : a homemade one
(composed of a solenoid coil of about ten loops of 1 cm
diameter) and a commercial one (30MHz-30GHz bandwidth)
and as shown in Figure 4, the second one was the best
candidate. In fact, an EM characterization demonstrated that
a homemade probe is unable to get an exploitable signal in
high frequency. It could be explained by misappropriated
impedance adaptation and lower probe sensitivity. Performing
an impedance adaptation could take a lot of time and the
result is not guaranteed. Moreover it’s noticeable, that in
Figure 4a the noise is greater than in Figure 4b where the ten
rounds of the AES are clearly identifiable.
C. EM curves interpretation
Compared to “compiled programs” the execution of an
interpreted program ( for example Java ) needs a virtual
machine. This software architecture could introduce a lot of
uncontrollable phenomena.
First, the “Garbage Collector” has been identified as
one of these phenomena. The garbage collector consists in
automatically cleaning the memory. The problem is that this
process is launched in an uncontrolled way from a user point
of view. Therefore, some EM curves are not exploitable (like
Fig. 4. EM curves captured by commercial and homemade probe
in Figure 5) because the signal is indistinguishable from the
noise. As the garbage collection consumes power and thus
increases the electromagnetic radiation of the chip, the curves
where the “Garbage Collector” is triggered are discriminated
simply by computing their temporal average. The average of
such curves appears to be 20% higher than the curves where
the collector is not triggered.
Fig. 5. Curve acquired while garbage collector was active : no AES visible
compared to 4b
Second, the“Just-In-Time-Compiler” was identified as a
possible problem. Indeed, the “Just In Time Compiler” is
an optimization executed by the virtual machine to speed-up
the multiple execution of a set of instructions. It consists
in compiling the instructions on-the-fly during their first
execution. This phenomenon is visible in Figure 4b where the
first round takes more time than the following ones. These
two issues introduce EM curve’s misalignment. The temporal
shift among EM curves varies between 0 to 110ms and may
impact the EMA.
In order to find a workaround to the EM curve’s misalign-
ment issue a timing synchronization methodology based on
the detection of the beginning of the first round was tried.
The statistical analysis failed due to temporal shift between
instructions within the round itself. To solve this problem two
successful solutions are described namely SDA and TRA.
D. Electromagnetic Analysis with Spectral Density based Ap-
proach
The misalignment could also be due to random delays that
could be introduced as a countermeasure in AES hardware
and software implementations. Several techniques in signal
processing exist and could be exploited, such as in [12] [13].
One of the synchronization techniques based on the frequency
approach is introduced in [14]. The authors show the effi-
ciency of DEMA on a very high speed embedded system.
This technique is based on the fact that the Power Spectrum
Density (PSD) of a “shifted signal” and the PSD of a “not
shifted signal” are the same.
In [15], the authors show that even if random delays are
introduced, the CEMA attack in the frequency domain is still
efficient on a program executed without a virtual machine on
a processor running at less than 12 MHz. Unlike previous
researches, our paper shows the efficiency of the CEMA
attack on a AES Java program executed on a virtual machine
on a high speed circuit (400MHz). [16] exploits the simulation
of the power consumption by using CPA (Correlation Power
Analysis). Their analysis in frequency domain allowed them
to find the secret key.
Fig. 6. CEMA in frequency domain
We performed such a statistical analysis in the frequency
domain on our own implementation of the AES. As
represented in Figure 6, it consists in applying the algorithm
in II-B not on the raw EM curves but on their PSD. More
precisely, we first remove the curves which includes the
garbage collection step. Second, the PSD of the remaining
curves (1500 curves) is computed ; next, for the 256 key
guesses, the power consumption model (in this case, the
Hamming Weight ) for the intermediate values (in this case,
SubByte output) is also computed. Finally, statistical analysis
by computing the Pearson’s correlation factor between PSD
and the Hamming Weights has been applied. The result of the
correlation is represented in Figure 7 for one key-byte where
the correlation factor of the right key guess is distinguishable
from the others. Next, acquisition and computing steps are
iterated to find the remaining key bytes.
With this result, the efficiency of the CEMA attack has
been shown on our AES J2ME program executed on a virtual
machine on a recent mobile phone (400MHz).
Fig. 7. Correlation result for one key Byte in the frequency domain
E. ElectroMagnetic Analysis using Template Resynchronisa-
tion Approach
In our experiments, it has been observed that the EM
signature of all SubBytes curves of our AES implementation
are very similar. It can be explained by the fact that the
SubBytes are implemented as a Look-Up-Table (LUT), i.e. an
access in an array and that this access emits a characteristic
EM signal (i.e. a signature). We use this property in order
to speed up the attack. The proposed approach consists, first
in extracting the signatures of the SubByte operation in the
EM signal (as represented in Figure 8) and them performing
the statistical analysis described in II-B in temporal domain
on these extracted signatures. More precisely, the following
pseudo-code describes the proposed approach:
 first a code of an LUT access has been developed. Its
signature has been defined as the reference pattern (or
“template”).
 by using a sliding window technique correlation, this
pattern has been researched in all curves.
 finally the CEMA is applied on the identified regions.
Fig. 8. CEMA by SuBbytes identification
Thanks to this technique, each byte of the key has
been recovered with only 256 EM curves (Figure 9). The
correlation factor is about 72%. If more curves are used the
correct guess key is more distinguishable (Figure 9).
Fig. 9. Correlation result for one key Byte
TABLE II
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSED APPROACHES
SDA TRA
Number of curves 20800 4096
Sorting curves yes no
Number of samples 1 Million 600
computing time 28h 1h
F. Comparison
With the previously described results, it has been proven
that SDA and TRA are efficient techniques to manage
desynchronisation introduced by a mobile phone’s JVM
during an EMA. The differences between both methodologies
are summarized in Table II. As shown in this table, the
SDA needs to select curves without “Garbage Collector”
while the selection is automatically realized by the SubBytes
operation identification technique of the TRA. An important
point to notice is that the first one requires four times more
curves than the second one. On the opposite, the second
one needs to build a template before performing the attack.
The real disadvantage in the first one is the number of
samples (millions) compared to the second one (hundreds).
Consequently more computer resources are necessary to
perform the DSP and to apply the CEMA.
It has been shown that CEMA on our AES implementation
on a mobile phone is also possible despite “irregularities”
introduced by the JVM. By comparing both proposed ap-
proaches, the fastest has been identified. The next interesting
challenge was to attack an AES cryptographic library using
TRA.
G. EMA on Bouncy Castle AES for mobile phone
1) BouncyCastle implementation: Bouncy Castle is an open
source lightweight library used by Java applications which
need cryptography. It provides support for standards such
as Transport Layer Security, Public Key Infrastructure and
Certificate Management Protocol. This paper treats the AES
implementation part.
To begin, a first acquisition was made. Visually, only 6
“patterns” were identifiable, compared to our implementation
(Figure 10).
In fact, the analysis of the code shows that AES rounds
are grouped in pairs. That explains the EM curve shape. The
Fig. 10. EM curve corresponding to AES implementation of Bouncy Castle
challenge is to find the key without any knowledge of the
source code.
2) Methodology and attack results: Our hypothesis was
that the implementation of the SubBytes could be the same as
on a 32 bit processor architecture, i.e. a 832 LUT. Therefore
the template previously defined for our implementation could
be used for the identification of the Bouncy Castle’s SubBytes
function operation. Processing has been made in this manner
and it has been discovered that the CEMA succeeds with
only 250 curves (for each byte of key) with a correlation
factor of 77% (Figure 11).
Fig. 11. Correlation result for Bouncy Castle AES (for one key byte)
This study demonstrates that an EM attack is possible with-
out knowing the source code of an external library. This kind
of attack could be dangerous because it could be generalized
to all AES implementations on a 32 bit processor where the
SubBytes operation is implemented by a 8x32 LUT.
IV. CONCLUSION
The security of the mobile phone becomes a crucial point
because more and more applications manipulate private data
and run sensitive applications putting into play cryptographic
algorithms with secret keys. Retrieving such secret keys can
be vital in some forensic procedures or for the recovery
of encrypted data. In this article, two methodologies have
been proposed and compared to do CEMA : a Spectral Den-
sity based Approach and Template based Resynchronisation
Approach. These methodologies have been tested on two
different implementations of an AES. We show that both solve
the misalignment problem. It also has been shown that the
TRA can be transposed to a legacy cryptographic library and
can probably be applied to other Java platforms. With the
TRA, one byte of the key has been found in 1 hour and
by analyzing only 250 curves. This study highlight the fact
that Java developers have to use secure cryptographic libraries
embedding countermeasures against EMA. A secure hardware
cryptographic implementation is also possible to secure mobile
phones.
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